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Abstract
Nonhuman great apes show remarkable behavioural flexibility. Some individuals are even able to use water as a tool: They 
spit water into a vertical tube to make a peanut float upwards until it comes into reach (floating peanut task; FPT). In the 
current study, we used the FPT to investigate how visual feedback, an end-state demonstration and a social demonstration 
affect task performance in nonhuman great apes in three experiments. Our results indicate that apes who had acquired the 
solution with a clear tube maintained it with an opaque one. However, apes starting with an opaque tube failed to solve the 
task. Additionally, facing the peanut floating on a water-filled tube (i.e., an end-state demonstration) promoted success inde-
pendent on the availability of visual feedback. Moreover, experiencing how water was poured into the tube either by a human 
demonstrator or by a water tap that had been opened either by the ape or a human did not seem to be of further assistance. 
First, this study suggests that great apes require visual feedback for solving the FPT, which is no longer required after the 
initial acquisition. Second, some subjects benefit from encountering the end-state, a finding corroborating previous studies.
Keywords Floating object task · Innovation · Primates · Social learning · Tool use
Introduction
Humans use a variety of tools in their daily lives and may 
have evolved specific cognitive adaptations for tool use 
(Csibra and Gergely 2009; Hernik and Csibra 2009; Vaesen 
2012). While humans have long been considered to be the 
only species that manufactures tools, it is now well known 
that some other species such as chimpanzees or New Cal-
edonian crows do so as well (Beck 1980; Shumaker et al. 
2011). Innovative problem solving seems to develop late 
during human ontogeny with children becoming proficient 
by the age of six-to-eight years (Beck et al. 2011, 2012, 
2016; Chappell et al. 2013; Cutting et al. 2011; Hanus et al. 
2011). The term “innovation” is used with many meanings; 
one is invention and adoption by group members (Hochberg 
et al. 2017; Reader and Laland 2003), another one is innova-
tion as producing a novel solution to a problem (Beck et al. 
2011, 2012, 2014, 2016; Chappell et al. 2013; Cutting et al. 
2011, 2014; Griffin and Guez 2014; Laumer et al. 2017; 
Nielsen 2013; Nielsen et al. 2014). The latter meaning is the 
one that we use in this paper.
More precisely, innovation problems are usually tasks 
in which the structure of the experimental setup does not 
provide information about the precise actions required to 
reach the goal state (i.e., ill-structured problems; Cutting 
et al. 2011; Jonassen 1997). These tasks demand a creative 
approach to finding a solution, which may involve the use 
of novel tools (Beck et al. 2011, 2012, 2014, 2016; Chappell 
et al. 2013; Cutting et al. 2011, 2014; Griffin and Guez 2014; 
Laumer et al. 2017; Nielsen 2013; Nielsen et al. 2014). How-
ever, relatively little is known about the evolutionary roots 
of innovative problem solving.
One task that has been used to study human children as 
well as our closest living relatives, the nonhuman great apes, 
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is the floating peanut task (FPT; Hanus et al. 2011; Mendes 
et al.2007; Tennie et al. 2010). In the FPT, individuals have 
to pour water into a vertical clear tube which contains a 
peanut (or any other buoyant object) that floats upwards 
until it comes into reach. Recent studies have shown that 
human children performed decently by six-to-eight years of 
age (about 40–60% success) which is comparable to other 
innovation tasks; their performance increased with age when 
the tube already contained some water (Beck et al. 2011, 
2014, 2016; Chappell et al. 2013; Cutting et al. 2011, 2014; 
Hanus et al. 2011). Moreover, when children were given a 
social demonstration, they copied the precise actions of the 
experimenter to fill the tube with water, involving an inter-
mediate step that was causally irrelevant (i.e., filling water 
from a bottle into a cup first; Nielsen 2013). When great apes 
where tested in the same task, they generally used a different 
technique from children who used a bottle for transferring 
the water by pouring water from their mouths (Hanus et al. 
2011; Mendes et al. 2007; Tennie et al. 2010).
Recent studies have shown that Sumatran orang-utans 
(Pongo abelii) and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) can solve 
the FPT (Hanus et al. 2011; Mendes et al. 2007), whereas 
none of the Bornean orang-utans (Pongo pygmaeus), goril-
las (Gorilla gorilla) and brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus 
apella) tested did (Hanus et al. 2011; Renner et al. 2017). 
All Sumatran orang-utans (N = 5) solved the task spontane-
ously (and about 20% of the Bornean orang-utans showed 
unsuccessful spitting behaviour) and so did 21% of the 
chimpanzees (unsuccessful spitting behaviour: 17%; Hanus 
et al. 2011; Mendes et al. 2007). Interestingly, none of the 
chimpanzees from another population were successful 
at first with their familiar water dispenser, but when they 
were presented with a novel water dispenser, 11% solved 
the task (and 26% showed unsuccessful spitting behaviour; 
Hanus et al. 2011). The authors interpreted this evidence as 
a functional fixedness effect, that is, apes were fixated on 
the familiar function of the water dispenser which hindered 
them using it in a novel functional context (Duncker 1945; 
Hanus et al. 2011). Bonobos (Pan paniscus) have not been 
tested with this paradigm so far.
It is still unclear, however, whether successful subjects 
really anticipated the effect that spitting water into the tube 
would have on the peanut’s position or if they had added 
water to the tube for some other reason (e.g., to make contact 
with the peanut) and upon seeing its positive effects repeated 
the action until they managed to extract the peanut from 
the tube. Mendes et al. (2007) suggested using an opaque 
tube in the FPT to address this question. This would show if 
apes solving the task are aware of the process that would be 
occurring inside the opaque apparatus before they get feed-
back for their actions. The FPT requires repeated responses 
(i.e., minimized chance of discoveries by trial and error), but 
its complexity (or opacity) is not beyond apes’ capabilities 
so that it makes the task adequate to test apes’ anticipatory 
skills. This is an important consideration because if subjects 
were to succeed in such a task, it would indicate that visual 
feedback is not essential and would suggest that individuals 
can anticipate the effect that pouring water has on the posi-
tion (and therefore accessibility) of the peanut.
Visual feedback can play an important role in problem 
solving (e.g., Köhler 1925; Taylor et al. 2010; Völter and 
Call 2012) and refers to any visual stimuli that serve as posi-
tive or negative feedback for an individual’s actions. This 
feedback helps to assess if the actions are likely to obtain 
the desired goal, e.g., when a chimpanzee is raking in a food 
reward with a stick, the chimpanzee can assess her/his pro-
gress by observing the food coming closer. Visual feedback 
generated by an individual’s own actions can facilitate or 
impede the appearance of an efficient solution to a problem. 
For instance, pushing an object away from the subject to 
overcome a barrier that is preventing its direct retrieval is 
difficult because subjects cannot resist bringing the object 
closer and consequently, after pushing it away, they repeat-
edly bring it back to the starting position (e.g., Guillaume 
and Meyerson 1930; Köhler 1925). The timing of feedback 
in relation to the solution, and not just its nature, is also 
important. For example, Taylor et al. (2010) presented New 
Caledonian crows with a vertical string pulling task in which 
they could pull up a string to which a piece of food was 
attached. All crows succeeded when they had full visual 
access to the string. Thereafter, the crows also solved a visu-
ally restricted version of the task in which a platform limited 
visual access. However, blocking visual feedback before first 
acquisition substantially hindered the solution and only one 
crow succeeded spontaneously (Taylor et al. 2010). Völter 
and Call (2012) presented nonhuman great apes with an 
analogous task in which apes could crank up a piece of food 
that was attached to a string inside an either clear or opaque 
apparatus (Völter and Call 2012). Some subjects spontane-
ously solved the task with the clear version, but all subjects 
failed with the opaque one. However, after apes had acquired 
the solution with the clear apparatus, they transferred it to 
the opaque one (Völter and Call 2012). Both studies sug-
gest that while feedback was required for acquisition of the 
solution, it was no longer needed to maintain performance. 
An important question is if the impact of visual feedback 
would also be modulated by task difficulty. When Völter 
and Call (2012) presented apes with two less complex prob-
lems (i.e., pushing out a food item from a horizontal tube 
or removing sticks from a tower to release a food reward), 
the visual feedback was not necessary to succeed. However, 
apes were faster when visual feedback was available than 
when it was not, suggesting that visual feedback supports 
more efficient problem solving (Völter and Call 2012). 
These results highlight that the effect of visual feedback is 
modulated by task complexity and its timing (i.e., before or 
793Animal Cognition (2019) 22:791–805 
1 3
after the solution). Yet, the crank task might not be the best 
problem to investigate insightful anticipation since first, it 
employs a mechanism which is artificial and not easy to 
grasp for the apes and secondly, the task is still solvable by 
persistent manipulation of the apparatus. Thus, it would be 
interesting to further investigate the role of visual feedback 
in the FPT which meets both criteria (i.e., intuitive and not 
solvable with persistence alone).
Another study with apes assessed the effect of additional 
information in the FPT. Tennie et al. (2010) provided chim-
panzees either with a full demonstration of the solution by 
a conspecific or by a human. They found no evidence that 
observing another ape solving the task was more useful than 
just observing the changes that occurred to the peanut’s loca-
tion when a human experimenter poured water into the tube 
from a bottle (ape: 38% vs. bottle: 21%). Tennie et al. (2010) 
concluded that emulation learning explains the finding, that 
is, chimpanzees reproduced the end-state using their own 
actions, since there was no difference between a demon-
stration showing the precise actions required and a bottle 
demonstration (see also Call et al. 2005). Interestingly, chim-
panzees also did not benefit more from encountering a tube 
that already contained some water (i.e., a partial solution) 
compared to a dry tube (Hanus et al. 2011).
In the current study we presented naïve chimpanzees 
with an opaque version of the FPT that prevented them from 
receiving visual feedback about the effect that spitting water 
into the tube had on the peanut’s position (Experiment 1). 
After a baseline with a dry tube, chimpanzees received some 
hints about how to solve the task: In the end-state condition, 
they encountered a water-filled tube with the peanut floating 
atop. In the human demonstration condition, they watched 
how the experimenter poured water into the tube until the 
peanut emerged at the opening. As the classical FPT is typi-
cally solved by a minority of apes only, we anticipated that 
depriving subjects of any visual feedback would make the 
task extremely difficult. Consequently, we complemented 
the opaque FPT experiment with two other experiments. 
We investigated whether bonobos and chimpanzees from 
another population would benefit from other kinds of feed-
back (Experiment 2). More specifically, we first established 
a baseline with the clear dry tube followed by three condi-
tions that provided apes with additional information about 
task affordances (end-state, water tap turned on by the ape, 
water tap turned on by the experimenter). We further pre-
sented apes that had previously solved the clear tube with an 
opaque tube to find out whether disrupting visual feedback 
after acquisition affected their performance (Experiment 3). 
Therefore, we presented subjects with a clear dry tube first 
and then, with a dry opaque one. Furthermore, we investi-
gated whether successful subjects confronted with an inef-
fective opaque tube differentially perseverated in pouring 
water depending on whether the cause of failure was visible 
or not. In the visual cause condition, subjects could see that 
the water escaped through a hole at the front of the tube 
while in the no visual cause condition, they did not receive 




Twenty-four chimpanzees living at Sweetwaters Chimpanzee 
Sanctuary (Ol Pejeta Conservancy, Laikipia, Kenya) par-
ticipated in the study. Among these were 14 females and 
ten males ranging from eight to 28 years (Table S1). The 
majority of chimpanzees was orphans, were born in the 
wild and came to the sanctuary after being confiscated from 
the illegal bushmeat and pet trade. They were all raised by 
humans in a highly comparable way, living together with 
peers after arriving at the sanctuary. Chimpanzees lived in 
two social groups with access to extensive outdoor enclo-
sures and indoor sleeping rooms. They spent the day in the 
large outdoor enclosures and the night in the indoor sleep-
ing rooms. The outside enclosures comprised bushland, 
trees and open areas. Since apes could exhibit many of 
their natural behaviours in this landscape (e.g., climbing or 
travelling long distances) and were part of a large social 
group, no special enrichment devices were needed to keep 
them busy throughout the day. The indoor sleeping rooms 
offered multiple platforms and materials for nest building. 
Chimpanzees were regularly fed throughout the study period 
and their diet comprised mainly local vegetables and fruits. 
All apes remained in their original housing locations at the 
conclusion of the study. Tests were conducted in the indoor 
sleeping rooms on a voluntary basis.
Materials
We used an opaque Plexiglas tube (26 cm × 5 cm; outer 
diameter) that was closed at both ends. A hole (about 3 cm 
x 3.5 cm) was drilled on its upper front (Fig. 1). The size 
of the tube and the position of the hole were such that they 
blocked visual access to a peanut located at the bottom of 
the tube. In fact, the peanut became visible only as it neared 
the hole. We attached a water dispenser to a grey PVC plate 
about a metre away from the tube.
Procedure
Each chimpanzee received a maximum of six sessions with 
one session per day. After a chimpanzee had solved the task 
once, the chimpanzee did not receive any further sessions. 
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First, the chimpanzee received two sessions with the base-
line condition (Fig. 1a) followed by two sessions with the 
end-state (Fig. 1b) and two with the human demonstration 
condition (Fig. 1c). Since the study was part of a larger study 
which required the same order for all individuals, we did not 
counterbalance the order of conditions across individuals. 
Besides, we did not expect a massive improvement in the 
human demonstration condition as a previous study sug-
gested that chimpanzees mainly benefit from encountering 
the end-state (Tennie et al. 2010). We conducted sessions on 
consecutive days (in exceptional cases some apes would not 
enter the test room and were then tested upon availability). 
We employed a human demonstration using a bottle (i.e., 
showing how to reach the outcome by a slightly different 
method) instead of one performed by a conspecific (i.e., 
showing the exact actions needed) because a recent study 
had shown that there was no difference between these two 
types of demonstrations (Tennie et al. 2010).
In the baseline condition, the chimpanzee watched from 
an adjacent room as the experimenter dropped a peanut into 
the tube. After entering, the chimpanzee had ten minutes 
to retrieve the peanut. In the end-state condition, the chim-
panzee encountered the water-filled tube with the peanut 
floating atop which allowed them to retrieve the peanut from 
the water. After the chimpanzee had taken the peanut from 
the tube, the door to the adjacent room was opened and the 
subject left the room so that the experimenter could pre-
pare the test trial. In the human demonstration condition, 
the chimpanzee witnessed from an adjacent room how the 
experimenter filled a bottle (capacity: 500 ml) with some 
water from the water dispenser and poured it into the tube. 
The experimenter repeated these actions three times until 
the tube was filled and the peanut came into reach (duration: 
about 60–90 s). Then, the chimpanzee entered the test room 
and could retrieve the peanut from the tube. After the chim-
panzee had obtained the peanut in the end-state and the 
human demonstration conditions, the chimpanzee waited in 
an adjacent room until the experimenter had exchanged the 
wet tube for a dry one. Then, the sessions continued as in 
the baseline condition and the subject had 10 min to solve 
the task. The experimenter only performed actions (dropping 
the peanut into the tube in the baseline condition or pour-
ing water into the tube in the human demonstration condi-
tion) when subjects were sitting at the mesh with their heads 
facing the tube. When subjects moved away, the caregivers 
called them and demonstrations continued as soon as they 
returned to their position. In this experiment as well as in the 
following two experiments, the apes were tested individually 
so that they could not observe the solution to the problem. 
Apes were separated from the group before entering the test 
room so that we were able to test specific individuals.
Coding and analyses
All sessions were videotaped. We coded success (i.e., 
retrieval of the peanut), latency to success, latency to first 
spit, number of spits and the mean inter-spit-interval using 
Solomon Coder (Péter 2011). In case subjects spat several 
times with one mouthful of water, this was still counted as 
one spit.
Results
None of the chimpanzees acquired the solution or added 
water to the tube during the baseline sessions. After receiv-
ing an end-state demonstration, one chimpanzee solved the 
task without ever having seen someone adding water to the 
tube before (Jane, session 4). Thus, she solved the task with-
out attaining visual feedback for her actions. Remarkably, 
she continuously added water to the tube without pausing 
once. Two additional females added water to the tube after 
an end-state demonstration, but not enough to obtain the 
peanut (Cheetah, session 3 + 4; Julia, session 4). After her 
first and second spit in session 3, Cheetah found a vegeta-
ble stalk and inserted it into the tube repeatedly for about 
a minute. Thereafter, she quit the task. It is possible that 
the stick-like object distracted her from adding more water 
to the tube. Interestingly, all spitting behaviour except for 
one event (Cheetah, session 3) occurred very late in the ses-
sion, after more than 8 minutes (see Supplemental Material 
Fig. 1  The three conditions of 
Experiment 1: baseline condi-
tion (a), end-state condition 
(b) and human demonstration 
condition (C)
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for more details). None of the chimpanzees added water to 
the tube in the human demonstration condition. The three 
chimpanzees who added water to the tube were 11, 15 and 
28 years old (mean age of sample: 18 years).
Discussion
One chimpanzee solved the FPT when visual feedback was 
blocked after receiving information about the end-state of 
the task, i.e., encountering a water-filled tube with a peanut 
floating atop. Thus, at least one individual solved the task 
without receiving any immediate visual feedback for her 
spitting actions and without ever having seen water being 
poured into the tube before. This perseveration constitutes 
the first evidence, albeit weak, that an individual may have 
anticipated the consequences of her actions in the FPT. No 
other subjects showed this behaviour and the two chimpan-
zees who added water to the tube once or twice quit, per-
haps because they obtained no feedback. Moreover, none 
of the chimpanzees acquired the solution during the base-
line, suggesting that apes require visual feedback to solve 
the FPT spontaneously since at least some apes solved the 
task spontaneously in previous studies (Hanus et al. 2011; 
Mendes et al. 2007). Besides, chimpanzees were not further 
benefitting from a human demonstration, that is, none of 
the subjects added water to the tube in this condition. Due 
to a floor effect we could not run statistical analyses so that 
generalizations from these results are limited. However, the 
findings are consistent with the idea that end-state informa-
tion facilitated spitting behaviour in some individuals in the 
FPT when visual feedback was blocked. Although emulation 
and imitation learning were not directly compared in the 
current study, findings corroborate the idea that emulation 
learning was enough to explain chimpanzees’ success in a 
previous study (Tennie et al. 2010: see also Call et al. 2005).
One possibility why the human demonstration did not 
increase success rates in chimpanzees is that subjects 
received no bottle, thus preventing them to imitate the pre-
cise actions that the demonstrator performed. Although 
we do not know what chimpanzees would do when given 
the bottle, we consider it unlikely that success rates would 
increase for three reasons. First, observing a demonstration 
by another chimpanzee using her mouth in the FPT was as 
effective as observing a human employing the bottle in a 
previous study (Tennie et al. 2010). Second, using a bottle to 
transport water (i.e., using a tool to transport a tool) is likely 
to be more difficult than using one’s mouth (i.e., transport 
the tool itself). Chimpanzees often carry objects and food 
items in their mouths, but rarely use containers to transport 
objects. Third, from the point of view of motor skills, filling 
the bottle with water and emptying its contents into the tube 
might be more challenging than spitting it from the mouth.
Furthermore, conditions differed in regard to their rein-
forcement structure. While subjects’ actions were reinforced 
during the end-state and the human demonstration conditions 
when they retrieved the peanut from the tube, they were not 
reinforced during the baseline condition. Such reinforcement 
might have led to a higher motivation to engage with the task 
thus providing a better explanation than emulation learning 
for the spitting behaviour of the three individuals. However, 
first, a recent study showed a positive effect of social dem-
onstrations in the FPT, even though apes were not reinforced 
directly during these demonstrations since a dominant con-
specific was in the same room with the subject and always 
took and ate the peanut (Tennie et al. 2010). Second, chim-
panzees readily manipulated the tube and the water dispenser 
during baseline sessions, something that indicates that they 
were motivated to engage with the task. Yet, it is still pos-
sible that observing a conspecific accessing and eating a pea-
nut might have a comparable reinforcing effect as eating the 
peanut oneself, an issue that requires further investigation. 
Note, however, that reinforcement may also play a role in 
emulation learning in natural settings where food leftovers, 
which can be considered in some cases “end-states”, may 
act as reinforcers. Future studies could directly compare the 
relationship between end-state and social demonstrations on 
the one hand and the reinforcement that subjects experience 
themselves or observe in others on the other hand.
One reason why the pouring demonstrations in the current 
and previous studies might not have been more effective is 
that the change in the position of the peanut was not caused 
by the subjects’ own actions. In other words, if the subject 
had caused the change and not been a mere observer of both 
the cause and the effect, this would have been more effective 
in producing a solution. Therefore, in the next experiment 
we devised a task in which the subject caused the change 
during the demonstration phase, but using different means 
of what the subject would be required to do during the test 
phase (i.e., pour water from her/his mouth into the tube). 
More specifically, we presented chimpanzees and bonobos 
with the clear version of the FPT followed by three condi-
tions: an end-state demonstration condition, a condition in 
which they themselves activated a tap that filled the tube 
with water and brought the peanut within reach and a condi-




Six bonobos and 18 chimpanzees participated in the study 
(Table S2). All apes were housed at the Wolfgang Köhler 
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Primate Research Centre (WKPRC) at Leipzig Zoo (Leipzig, 
Germany). Among these were 19 females and five males 
ranging from six to 48 years of age. Eleven were nursery-
reared, ten were mother-reared and the rearing history of 
three was unknown. While all six bonobos and five chim-
panzees were naïve to the FPT, 13 chimpanzees had been 
presented with this task in previous studies, but had failed to 
solve it (Hanus et al. 2011; Tennie et al. 2010; Table S2). All 
subjects lived in social groups of various sizes with access 
to indoor and outdoor enclosures that comprised various 
enrichment devices such as trees and ropes to climb on, 
shaking boxes and poking bins. Additionally, apes were fed 
enrichment materials in the afternoon (e.g., wrapped up food 
in paper or jute). They stayed in their indoor sleeping rooms 
during the night and spent their day in the indoor or outdoor 
enclosures depending on the weather. Apes were fed with 
vegetables, fruits and sometimes eggs or meat; thus, they 
were neither food, nor water deprived at any time throughout 
the study. Participation in the study was voluntary and any 
food gained was additional to their daily diet. Testing took 
place individually in the apes’ indoor sleeping rooms and all 
apes remained in their original housing locations at the con-
clusion of the study. We stopped testing (and excluded from 
the analyses) two chimpanzees (Annett, Swela) because one 
refused to eat wet peanuts and one did not pull the string in 
the additional information phase (Nfinal= 22).
Materials
We used a dry clear Plexiglas tube (26 cm × 5 cm; outer 
diameter) that was closed at the bottom with a peanut inside 
(Fig. 2). For the bonobos, we could not use peanuts due to 
a peanut allergy of one individual. We assessed bonobos’ 
preference for dried pieces of apple and banana and used 
their preferred food item for the test. A black steel container 
(50 cm × 20 cm × 30 cm) filled with water was attached to the 
mesh (same as in Allritz et al. 2013). We used an open water 
source instead of a water dispenser. Although our choice 
made this experiment not comparable to Experiment 1, our 
goal here was not to compare experiments but to potentially 
increase the likelihood of success by increasing the salience 
of the water. The distance of the water to the tube varied 
across the ape groups due to the conditions of the respec-
tive sleeping rooms (bonobo, chimpanzee group 1: about 
2.25 m, chimpanzee group 2: about 1.40 m). In the “water 
tap by ape” and “water tap by human” condition, a water tap 
was attached above the tube (see Fig. 2c, d; Fig. S1). The 
tap could be opened by pulling a string so that water would 
flow into the tube. By pulling the string, a metal ring at the 
tap was moved towards the ape which produced a banging 
sound when the movement stopped. The string-pulling was 
actually non-functional and the water was turned on by the 
experimenter operating a valve out of sight.
Procedure
Apes received a maximum of eight sessions with one session 
per day. When apes solved the task once, they were not given 
further sessions. First, they received two sessions with the 
baseline condition followed by six sessions in which they 
received additional information (end-state, water tap by ape 
and water tap by human), counterbalanced for order across 
individuals. Each of the additional information conditions 
was given on two successive sessions. We administered all 
sessions on separate days either on consecutive days or a few 
days apart depending on other tests carried out at WKPRC. 
In the baseline condition, apes were presented with a dry 
tube containing a peanut (or a piece of dried apple or banana 
in case of the bonobos) for 10 min. In the end-state con-
dition, apes encountered a tube filled with water and the 
Fig. 2  The four conditions of Experiment 2: baseline condition (a), end-state condition (b), water tap by ape condition (c) and water tap by 
human condition (d)
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peanut floating atop (Fig. 2b). In the water tap by ape con-
dition, apes faced a tube with a peanut located inside. They 
could pull a string which moved a metal ring to “turn on” 
the water, while the experimenter actually operated a valve 
(Fig. 2c). When the tube was filled with water, they could 
retrieve the peanut from the tube. In the water tap by human 
condition, the water was turned on by the experimenter by 
moving the metal ring herself in view of the ape (Fig. 2d). 
Each session in the additional information phase consisted 
of three demonstrations, followed by the original test with 
a dry tube. Between the demonstrations the experimenter 
emptied the tube and placed a new peanut inside. After 
the demonstrations the water tap was removed and the wet 
tube was exchanged for a dry one. While the setup was pre-
pared, subjects waited in an adjacent room. Subjects were 
tested individually. However, in exceptional cases another 
individual was inside the test room area to ensure that apes 
felt secure (e.g., sometimes a juvenile was tested with her 
mother inside), but there were one or more rooms in between 
the two individuals and/or occluders were put up to ensure 
that apes could not watch the solution or even the subject 
getting water from the water source (or the demonstrations).
Coding and analyses
All sessions were videotaped. We coded success (i.e., 
retrieval of the peanut), latency to success, latency to first 
spit, number of spits and mean inter-spit-interval using 
Solomon Coder (Péter 2011). As before, in case subjects 
spat several times with one mouthful of water this was still 
counted as one spit. A second coder coded all videos with 
spitting behaviour from Experiments 2 and 3 and reliability 
was excellent (Pearson’s correlation coefficient: latency to 
success, r = 0.996, df = 20, p < 0.001; latency to first spit, 
r = 0.993, df = 50, p < 0.001; number of spits, r = 0.995, 
df = 50, p < 0.001).
Results
Two chimpanzees solved the FPT in the baseline sessions 
(Kofi, session 1; Sandra, session 2). Three additional chim-
panzees acquired the solution in the additional information 
phase, with two of them succeeding in the first session. More 
specifically, one subject solved the task after an end-state 
demonstration (Lobo, session 3) and one after activating 
the water tap herself (Alexandra, session 3). Moreover, one 
chimpanzee solved the task after an end-state demonstration 
(Kara, session 5), after she had already passed two unsuc-
cessful sessions with the water-tap by human condition. 
One additional chimpanzee and one bonobo added water 
to the tube, but not enough to obtain the peanut (Riet, base-
line; Fimi, baseline and water tap by ape; see Table 1 and 
Table S3). One subject employed two additional techniques 
to add water to the tube next to spitting: Kofi peed into the 
tube and used his hand once to transport the water. Interest-
ingly, all successful apes (mean age: 13 years) were younger 
than the mean age of our sample (23 years).
Discussion
Five chimpanzees solved the FPT by repeatedly spitting 
water into the clear tube until they could reach the peanut. 
Two of them did so spontaneously during the baseline while 
the other three solved the task after receiving additional 
information about the solution that always comprised the 
end-state (i.e., the peanut floating on a water-filled tube). 
Another chimpanzee and one bonobo added water to the 
tube, but not enough to extract the peanut. This finding cor-
roborates the results from Experiment 1 with an opaque tube 
and the ones by Tennie et al. (2010) with a clear tube which 
showed that chimpanzees benefited from encountering the 
end-state in the FPT, although the floor effect in Experiment 
2 again limits the generalizations that can be drawn from 
these findings alone (but see also Vale et al. 2017 for the 
positive effect of model demonstrations on the occurrence of 
solutions). We found no evidence of a difference with regard 
to success between conditions in which the ape or the human 
controlled the water tap to fill the tube, but the low success 
rate makes the interpretation of this result difficult. Future 
research could investigate whether the end-state produced 
by the individual’s own action versus the action of someone 
else affect the likelihood of learning by emulation.
While our results showed very low success rates in the 
FPT with a clear tube, a word of caution in interpreting these 
results is necessary. Some of our subjects had participated 
in previous studies using the FPT, but had failed the task 
while previously successful individuals who might have 
had a greater potential to solve the task were not included 
(Table S2; Hanus et al. 2011; Tennie et al. 2010). Further-
more, it is difficult to compare the baseline to the conditions 
in the additional information phase given that their order 
of presentation was not counterbalanced across subjects. 
However, this was not the goal here. A previous study had 
already established that additional baseline sessions did not 
improve performance (Hanus et al. 2011). More specifically, 
solutions typically occurred in the first or second baseline 
sessions or not at all (Hanus et al. 2011). The fact that three 
additional individuals apparently benefited from end-state 
conditions is, therefore, entirely consistent with previous 
studies.
To our knowledge we tested bonobos for the first time 
with the FPT. Although none of the six individuals solved 
the task, one subject added water to the tube in two ses-
sions, but not enough to obtain the dried piece of fruit. How-
ever, why no bonobo in comparison to chimpanzees solved 
the task remains an open question. Future studies could 
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investigate factors like the difference in food reward, or dif-
ferences in persistence and food motivation across species.
Our findings further support the idea that certain forms 
of visual feedback facilitated the solution in the FPT. As a 
next step, we assessed whether apes maintained the solution 
in the FPT with an opaque tube. In Experiment 1, one ape 
potentially anticipated the effect of the water on the peanut’s 
position, but all other subjects provided no evidence. Here 
we investigated whether apes would continue solving the 
task (by repeatedly pouring water in the tube) despite not 
being able to see the peanut moving upwards. This is equiva-
lent to the manipulation by Taylor et al. (2010) in the string 
pulling task and Völter and Call (2012) in the crank task. To 
do so, we presented chimpanzees and orang-utans who had 
already acquired the solution in the FPT with a clear tube 
and the opaque tube that we used in Experiment 1. In a final 
manipulation we confronted successful apes with the opaque 
tube with a hole drilled near the bottom so that any water 
that was poured into the tube escaped via this hole, thus, 
preventing the peanut from moving upwards. In the “visual 
cause” condition, the water escaped from a hole at the front, 
thus providing information about the cause for the peanut’s 
lack of upward movement. In the “no visual cause” condi-
tion, the water escaped from a hole at the back of the tube, 
out of sight of the apes. We examined if apes would change 
their behaviour (i.e., stop adding water to the tube) because 
of the visual feedback that they received and that contained 




Eight chimpanzees and five Sumatran orang-utans partici-
pated in the study (Table S4). They included nine females 
and four males ranging from nine to 25 years of age. Twelve 
of the 13 apes were mother-reared while the remaining 
one was nursery-reared. Apes were housed at the WKPRC 
(see Experiment 2 for housing conditions) except for two 
orang-utans who were housed at Zoo Dortmund (Dortmund, 
Germany). These two orang-utans had access to indoor and 
outdoor enclosures and lived in a social group. They partici-
pated voluntarily in the study by entering the sleeping room 
and engaging with the task. The orang-utans were regularly 
fed throughout the study period. They were neither water, 
nor food deprived so that the food they gained in this study 
was additional. All apes remained in their original housing 
locations at the conclusion of the study.
Subjects had previously solved the FPT with a clear tube 
except for one orang-utan (Tao) who as an infant had instead 
witnessed her mother solving the task (see Supplemental 
Online Material for more details). We also tested this sub-
ject to see if she remembered observing her mother solv-
ing the task (clear tube) and to increase our sample size 
(opaque tube). Subjects varied in the amount and the timing 
of their successful experience with the FPT. While the five 
Table 1  Results of Experiment 1–3: Success and spitting behaviour (i.e., successful and unsuccessful spitting  behaviour summarized) in the 
FPT. Sample sizes differ between conditions because apes did not receive any further sessions after they had solved the task once
a Fixed order of the conditions
b Counterbalanced order of the demonstration conditions with two sessions of each condition given consecutively (baseline fixed)
c Successful in the first demonstration condition that the subject received
d Successful in the second demonstration condition that the subject received
Experiment 1: opaque tube; naive  chimpanzeesa
Baseline End-state Human demo
Success 0/24 1/24 0/23
Spitting 0/24 3/24 0/23
Experiment 2: clear tube; naive and previously unsuccessful chimpanzees and  bonobosb
Baseline End-state Water tap by ape Water tap 
by human
Success 2/24 2/21c,d 1/20c 0/20
Spitting 6/24 2/21 2/20 1/20
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chimpanzees from Experiment 2 had solved the FPT only 
once about 1 month before, the other subjects had solved the 
task several times, but several years ago (see Supplemental 
Online Material for more details on the individual testing 
backgrounds).
Materials
We used the same clear tube as in Experiment 2. Addition-
ally, we used a modified version of the opaque tube from 
Experiment 1 that included the following changes (see 
Fig. 3): The tube was glued to a Plexiglas plate and a hose 
was attached to its back. The hose was connected to a valve 
that could be switched on and off. It was closed throughout 
the opaque condition to prevent the water from escaping 
the tube (Fig. 3a). The mesh surrounding the tube was cov-
ered so that apes could not see behind the tube. Apes were 
tested with the water source that was used when they first 
acquired the solution. Thus, we either used the black steel 
container from Experiment 2, a novel water dispenser or the 
familiar water dispenser. The distance of the water to the 
tube varied across the ape groups due to the different water 
sources and conditions of the sleeping rooms (chimpanzees: 
about 2.25 m or 1.40 m, orang-utans: about 2.25 m + 2 m in 
height). Due to experimenter error, we tested one chimpan-
zee (Frodo) with the familiar water dispenser although this 
individual had been tested with a novel one before (note that 
this chimpanzee still added water to the tube, yet, not enough 
to obtain the peanut).
Procedure
Apes received a maximum of four sessions with one ses-
sion per day. We administered all sessions on separate days 
either on consecutive days or a few days apart dependent 
on other tests carried out at WKPRC. However, we always 
administered the clear condition and the opaque condition 
on consecutive days (i.e., about 24 h between success in the 
clear condition and presentation with the opaque condition). 
We, therefore, administered one additional session with the 
clear tube with one orang-utan (Padana) to ensure the same 
timing between conditions (the data of the first session is 
presented in the results section). Each session lasted a maxi-
mum of 10 min. First, we presented apes with the clear tube 
followed by the opaque tube, each for two sessions. As soon 
as they solved the task in a given condition, they did not get 
a second session with that same condition. Only apes who 
solved the clear tube received the opaque tube. One orang-
utan (Toba) broke off the bottom of the clear tube in her first 
session and we repeated the session on the next day (see 
Supplemental Online Material for more details).
Three orangutans (Dokana, Padana, Raja) received two 
additional sessions with the opaque tube prior to the clear 
tube, resulting in a maximum of six sessions for these sub-
jects (2 opaque, 2 clear, 2 opaque). We did so because these 
individuals had already been re-tested with the clear tube in 
a recent study in which they all solved the task (unpublished 
data). Thus, we confronted them directly with the opaque 
tube. Since none of them solved the opaque tube in the first 
two sessions, we decided to give them the same procedure as 
the other apes (i.e., giving them two more sessions with the 
clear tube and then, two with the opaque tube). We made this 
decision because the time frame for maintaining the solution 
from the clear to the opaque tube was about 24 h for most of 
the apes while it was much longer for these three individuals.
In the clear condition, upon entering the room the ape 
encountered the peanut located inside a dry and clear tube 
(Fig. 2a). In the opaque condition, the experimenter placed 
a peanut near the opening of the tube with the aid of a stick 
which was dropped when the subjects approached the appa-
ratus (see Fig. 3a). In comparison to Experiment 1, a stick 
was used to avoid any physical contact with the ape since 
the ape was in the same room as the apparatus. Upon com-
pletion of the main phase of the experiment, apes who had 
been successful with the opaque tube received a follow-up 
test composed of two conditions presented in separate ses-
sions with the order of presentation counterbalanced across 
individuals. In the “visual cause” condition, the opaque tube 
had a hole located at its lower front so that any water poured 
into the tube escaped through it (Fig. 3b). In the “no visual 
Fig. 3  The three conditions of 
Experiment 3: opaque condition 
(a), visual cause condition (b) 
and no visual cause condition 
(c)
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cause” condition, the hole was located at the back of the tube 
hidden from the subject’s view (Fig. 3c). Both conditions 
were impossible to solve. Sessions lasted 10 min each.
Coding and analyses
We videotaped all sessions and scored success (i.e., retrieval 
of the peanut), latency to success, latency to first spit, num-
ber of spits, latency to first spit and the mean inter-spit-
interval using Solomon Coder (Péter 2011). As before, in 
case subjects spat several times with one mouthful of water 
this was still scored as one spit. We compared conditions 
for successful subjects performing Exact Wilcoxon signed 
rank tests in R (Hothorn and Hornik 2015; R Core Team 
2013). We analysed the two species pooled together due to 
the small sample size and because there is no clear evidence 
of a species difference so far with the FPT (Hanus et al. 
2011; Mendes et al. 2007).
Results
Clear tube
Ten out of 13 apes solved the FPT with a clear tube in the re-
test (77%; six chimpanzees and four orang-utans), i.e., they 
added enough water to obtain the peanut (two chimpanzees 
and one orang-utan were unsuccessful; see also Tables 1 and 
2). More specifically, seven individuals solved the task in the 
first session and three in the second one. Two of these three 
individuals (two orang-utans: Toba, Tao) had been trans-
ferred to a new holding facility and it could be that they 
were not aware of the water dispenser in the test room during 
the first session. Additionally, one of these two orang-utans 
(Toba) broke off the bottom of the tube in the first session 
after she had repeatedly spat saliva into the dry tube. Both 
individuals were provided with a water bucket in the second 
session and then, solved the task (see Supplemental Online 
Material for more details).
Three subjects remained unsuccessful in the re-test with 
the clear tube, yet, two of them added water to the tube. One 
orang-utan’s (Raja) failure was caused by wood wool that 
she stuffed into the tube. Although she subsequently filled 
it with water to the top, the peanut got stuck by the wood 
wool and, therefore, she failed to retrieve it. On the second 
session, she quit after three spits, thus, failing the task. One 
chimpanzee (Frodo) added five mouthful of water in his 
second session, but failed to obtain the peanut as it was not 
close enough to the opening yet, while another chimpanzee 
(Lome) did not add any water to the tube. The successful 
subjects were comparable in age with the unsuccessful ones 
(successful: mean = 15 years, range = 9–25; unsuccessful: 
mean = 14 years, range = 10–20), but the sample size was 
too small to draw any further conclusions.
Opaque tube
Seven out of ten apes solved the opaque tube (70%; five 
chimpanzees and two orang-utans), i.e., they added enough 
water to the tube to obtain the peanut without receiving 
visual feedback for their actions (one chimpanzee and two 
orang-utans were unsuccessful; see also Tables 1 and 2). 
Six of them did so in the first session and one in the second 
session. Moreover, one unsuccessful orang-utan (Dokana, 
first presentation of the opaque tube) and one unsuccessful 
chimpanzee (Sandra) added water to the opaque tube, while 
one orang-utan (Tao) did not add any water. The successful 
subjects were comparable in age with the unsuccessful ones 
(successful: mean = 13 years, range = 9–20; unsuccessful: 
mean = 18 years, range = 9–25), but the sample size was too 
small to draw any further conclusions. All three orang-utans 
(Dokana, Padana, Raja) who received two additional ses-
sions with the opaque tube before they encountered the clear 
tube (and then the opaque tube again, see methods) added 
water to the opaque tube in the first two sessions, but none of 
them solved the task within these first two sessions.
There was no difference between the clear and the opaque 
conditions with regard to latency to success (Wilcoxon test: 
Table 2  Results of Experiment 
3 by species (only successful 
sessions included); median 
(range)







Chimp (N = 6) Clear 6 (4–8) 125 (23–239) 22 (3–194) 12 (4–30)
Chimp (N = 5) Opaque 4 (3–8) 219 (146–289) 54 (33–120) 28 (10–84)
Chimp (N = 5) Front 24 (4–35) NA 17 (4–130) 30 (17–80)
Chimp (N = 5) Back 10 (7–18) NA 27 (14–61) 38 (29–86)
Orang (N = 4) Clear 3 (2–5) 134 (66–280) 74 (18–137) 28 (22–32)
Orang (N = 2) Opaque 2 (2–2) 217 (121–313) 83 (35–130) 93 (29–156)
Orang (N = 2) Front 5 (4–6) NA 46 (25–67) 98 (60–136)
Orang (N = 2) Back 3 (3–3) NA 55 (41–70) 232 (230–234)
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T = 22, p = 0.219, N = 7), latency to first spit (Wilcoxon test: 
T = 20, p = 0. 343, N = 7), mean inter-spit-interval (Wilcoxon 
test: T = 18, p = 0.156, N = 6, one tie) or number of spits 
(N = 5, two ties; no Wilcoxon test possible due to small sam-
ple size).
Follow‑up test
There were significant differences in spitting frequency 
between the baseline and experimental conditions (Fried-
man test: χ2 = 9.0, df = 2, p = 0.011, N = 7). Subjects spat 
significantly less often in the baseline compared to the 
front and back conditions (Wilcoxon test: T = 21, p = 0.031, 
N = 6 in both cases), but there were no significant differ-
ences between the front and back conditions (Wilcoxon test: 
T = 22, p = 0.234, N = 7). However, subjects spat more often 
in the first compared to the second experimental condition 
that they received (Wilcoxon test: T = 26.5, p = 0.047, N = 7). 
There were also significant differences between conditions 
with regard to the mean spitting frequency (Friedman test: 
χ2 = 6.0, df = 2, p = 0.050, N = 7). However, pairwise com-
parisons failed to confirm the differences between condi-
tions (Wilcoxon tests: T < 25, p = 0.109, N = 7 in all cases). 
Similarly, there was no significant difference in the latency 
to spit between the first and the second conditions that sub-
jects received (Wilcoxon test: T = 21, p = 0.300, N = 7). The 
descriptive statistics for each species are reported in Table 2.
Discussion
Chimpanzees and orang-utans who acquired the solution of 
the FPT one month to nine years before, solved the task 
again upon presentation. Moreover, most of the success-
ful subjects transferred the solution to an opaque tube that 
deprived them of visual feedback, i.e., they could not per-
ceive the effect that their spitting actions had on the peanut’s 
position. These results suggest that apes were able to repro-
duce the solution to a problem after a long period of time 
since the first solution and that the ability to solve this task 
was independent of visual feedback after first acquisition.
Apes continued to solve the task after they were deprived 
of visual feedback despite having to perform repeated 
actions over the course of about two-and-a-half minutes 
(from first spit to the retrieval of the peanut) without being 
able to assess if their manipulation was successful. While 
seven apes (70%) showed this high level of persistence, three 
apes (30%) failed to transfer the solution to the opaque tube. 
Since two of them still added water to the tube, visual feed-
back might have been essential for them to solve the task. 
These results, taken together with those of Experiment 1, 
are consistent with the findings of two recent studies, one 
with a cranking task in great apes and one with a vertical 
string pulling task in New Caledonian crows (Taylor et al. 
2010; Völter and Call 2012; see also Vale et al. 2016). In 
these studies, some individuals acquired the solution when 
visual feedback was available and also transferred it to an 
apparatus that restricted or completely blocked visual feed-
back. However, none of them (except for one crow) acquired 
the solution when visual feedback was restricted or blocked, 
like in Experiment 1 (Taylor et al. 2010; Völter and Call 
2012). One major difference between these studies and the 
current one is that the FPT is not solvable by persevering 
with a manipulation at the apparatus, but requires relating a 
seemingly non-related object (i.e., the water dispenser or the 
water) to the task. Although the mechanism was more natu-
ral and did not comprise a human-made mechanism such as 
cranking, apes did not show evidence that they anticipated 
the outcome of their actions in the FPT.
Apes solved the FPT although they had not faced the task 
for a period that ranged from one month up to nine years. 
Although this may be an indication of good memory perfor-
mance, it may also be a sign of problem-solving consistency. 
That is, those individuals who solved the task originally, 
also solved it (independently) a few years later and without 
necessarily recalling that solution. Without comparing the 
initial latencies to solve the task with the latencies in the 
current study it is unclear whether their success represents 
a case of good memory or re-innovation. Although this 
would have been a desirable comparison, we were unable 
to carry it out because first, only five subjects solved the 
task in Experiment 2 and second, overall few subjects have 
solved the task spontaneously in Experiment 2 or in previous 
studies which makes it difficult to assess latencies (but see 
Vale et al. 2016).
When subjects faced failure in the follow-up test, they 
perseverated in adding water to the tube although their 
attempts substantially decreased in the second session. 
Indeed, the order of presentation of the conditions rather 
than the conditions themselves (i.e., seeing the cause of 
failure or not) seemed to be the factor that best explained 
subjects’ reduction in spitting frequency. In contrast, mean 
spitting frequency did not differ between conditions. These 
findings suggest that apes did not take into account visual 
feedback about the cause of their failure because they did 
not decrease their spitting behaviour when they could see 
the water flowing out of the tube. However, a larger sample 
would be needed to analyse this in greater detail as few gen-
eralizations can be made from such a small sample.
General Discussion
We found that visual feedback can play a pivotal role in the 
initial acquisition of the solution to an innovation problem 
in great apes, but decreases its importance thereafter. While 
apes were able to solve the task again after a period of time 
802 Animal Cognition (2019) 22:791–805
1 3
(ranging from one month to nine years) with the clear tube 
and then transferred the solution to an opaque tube that com-
pletely blocked visual feedback (Experiment 3), they failed 
to solve the task when visual feedback was absent when they 
first encountered the task (Experiment 1). Additionally, the 
type of feedback about their failure (i.e., a seen or unseen 
cause) did not alter their spitting behaviour, i.e., when the 
water escaped through a hole at the front or back of the tube 
(Experiment 3). Intriguingly, observing the solution led to 
success in some individuals who had not been successful 
before: some apes who experienced a water-filled (clear or 
opaque) tube solved the task subsequently while experienc-
ing how the water was added to the tube by a human demon-
strator or a water tap did not seem to be of further assistance 
(Experiments 1, 2). However, generalizations about social 
learning in apes are limited from these specific findings, 
since no statistical analyses were possible due to few sub-
jects solving the task overall.
One individual solved the opaque tube after experienc-
ing an end-state demonstration, that is, she solved the task 
without experiencing the effect that adding water to the tube 
had on the peanut’s position. This provides some (albeit 
weak) evidence that one subject may have anticipated the 
outcome of her actions in the FPT. However, the FPT may 
have been too difficult for apes to show their anticipatory 
abilities (see also Redshaw and Suddendorf 2016; Völter 
and Call 2014). Even in its easier version (clear tube), only 
a minority of apes solved the task (Hanus et al. 2011; Ten-
nie et al. 2010). Furthermore, the task required the ability 
to delay gratification as well as the necessary motivation to 
continue spitting despite not obtaining anything. Although 
apes generally perform well in delay of gratification tasks 
and can wait for 60–180 s to get a higher valued reward 
(Beran 2002; Rosati et al. 2007), not seeing any change in 
the peanut’s position may have discouraged them. Recall that 
apes needed on average about 150 s from their first spit to 
retrieve the peanut from the opaque tube in Experiment 3. 
Therefore, we must interpret our results with caution. Apes 
may be able to anticipate the outcome of their actions with 
easier tasks since studies have shown that they possess some 
future planning abilities (Janmaat et al. 2014; Mulcahy and 
Call 2006; Osvath and Osvath 2008; van Schaik et al. 2013; 
Völter and Call 2014).
Our findings are consistent with previous studies showing 
that great apes and New Caledonian crows were depend-
ent on visual feedback for acquisition, but not for mainte-
nance of the solution in a string pulling task (Taylor et al. 
2010; Völter and Call 2012). Acquisition of the solution in 
the FPT could be based on different underlying processes. 
First, apes might have solved the FPT by anticipating the 
outcome of their actions and some form of causal under-
standing (see also Köhler 1925; Völter and Call 2014; Völter 
et al. 2016). We found little evidence for this (see Redshaw 
and Suddendorf 2016). Second, apes may have added water 
to the tube to move the peanut intentionally (i.e., acted on a 
creative idea; see Bateson 2014) and then, were differentially 
reinforced by visual feedback (i.e., the peanut nearing the 
tube’s opening). Third, apes may have solved the task by 
trial-and-error learning and differential visual reinforcement. 
In this case, they would have added water to the tube by 
chance resulting in differential reinforcement. We consider 
the second alternative somewhat more likely than the third 
one because spitting into the tube is a novel and unusual 
response (recall that overall only few apes spat into the tube, 
see also Hanus et al. 2011; Tennie et al. 2010). Moreover, 
apes sometimes solve tasks apparently with little visual feed-
back about task affordances and/or without any evidence 
of learning by inferring the task’s causal structure (Boesch 
2013; Hanus and Call 2008, 2011; Völter et al. 2016).
Most apes solved the task again after months and even 
years after the original solution. This finding can again be 
interpreted in different ways. First, this may be an indicator 
of intra-individual consistency in problem solving and apes 
may have re-innovated when presented with the task for a 
second time. However, it is an open question which charac-
teristics would classify an innovator in the FPT. A recent 
study with human children showed that success in another 
innovation problem (the hook task) was not predicted by 
divergent thinking or executive functions such as inhibition, 
working memory, or attentional flexibility (Beck et al. 2016). 
Yet, this study found that a measurement that is potentially 
associated with general intelligence predicted success. Sec-
ond, apes’ success may be an indicator of excellent long-
term memory. They potentially remembered the solution, 
e.g., via cued recall when facing the tube again (Lewis et al. 
2017; Martin-Ordas et al. 2014; Martin-Ordas et al. 2013). 
Generally, it seems likely that apes remembered the solu-
tion with both tubes (i.e., clear and opaque) because recent 
studies have shown good long-term memory performance 
in wild and captive apes, spanning months and even years 
(Janmaat et al. 2013, 2014, 2016; Kano and Hirata 2015; 
Lewis et al. 2017; Martin-Ordas et al. 2010, 2013, 2014; 
Mendes and Call 2014). However, to clearly disentangle 
these two possibilities one would need to compare laten-
cies, an analysis we were not able to carry out in this study. 
A recent study performed such an analysis and found that 
chimpanzees who learned to manufacture an elongated tool 
three years and seven months before used the same solution 
strategy and did so faster than during first acquisition and 
also transferred it to an opaque apparatus (Vale et al. 2016). 
Future studies will show if this was also the case in the FPT.
One possible explanation for why subjects solved the 
opaque versions of these tasks after having solved the 
clear ones is that they were able to recall the effect of their 
actions despite not seeing it. Alternatively, after solving the 
task, motor programs alone were capable of sustaining the 
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solution despite the lack of visual feedback. Although this 
could explain the results, it does not seem enough to explain 
the results of two simpler tasks employed by Völter and Call 
(2012) that subjects solved even without the benefit of visual 
feedback. In these tasks, apes had to either poke out a food 
reward from a clear or opaque tube or to remove sticks from 
a clear or opaque tower so that a food reward was released. 
Although one could argue that the two less complex tasks 
provide this evidence given that solutions occurred even in 
the opaque versions that required multiple steps (Völter and 
Call 2012), the actions required to solve these tasks were 
relatively simple (insert a stick in a tube or remove sticks 
from a tower), thus, raising the possibility that subjects may 
have arrived to them by chance. Furthermore, even those 
simple actions caused some visible change in the state of 
the world (e.g., sticks off the box) that the other tasks (crank 
task, FPT) did not provide.
Some of the apes acquired the solution in the FPT after 
experiencing a water-filled tube with the peanut floating 
atop. More specifically, in case of the clear tube two apes 
benefited from an end-state demonstration and one individ-
ual from perceiving how water from a water tap filled the 
tube until the peanut could be reached (Experiment 2). In 
case of the opaque tube one subject solved the task and two 
further individuals added water to the tube after receiving 
an end-state demonstration once or twice (Experiment 1). 
Admittedly, this is not a major improvement and we were not 
able to carry out statistical analyses due to this floor effect, 
but one has to consider that in case of the clear tube half 
of our sample comprised previously unsuccessful apes so 
that chances of them being successful were reduced (Hanus 
et al. 2011; Tennie et al. 2010). In fact, previous studies have 
established that subjects who had failed to solve the FPT in 
the first two sessions were unable to improve if they were 
simply given additional sessions (Hanus et al. 2011; Tennie 
et al. 2010). The relative low success attained by subjects 
even after witnessing the peanut floating upwards suggests 
that feedback about the water causing the peanut’s move-
ment per se is not a clue that any subject would use to solve 
the task (contrary to children who would imitate the precise 
actions required; Nielsen 2013). One possible explanation 
is that witnessing an effect is less memorable than causing 
an effect, but when subjects also had the chance to make 
the tap drop water in the tube this did not increase success 
rates. Obviously, here the means that they experienced or 
used themselves (pulling a string to release water from a tap) 
during the exposure phase and those that they would have 
to use during the test (pouring water from the mouth) were 
different, and consequently subjects may have not transferred 
the solution using different means. Thus, our findings cor-
roborate the ones of Tennie et al. (2010), although we did 
not explicitly test for imitation versus emulation learning as 
apes were not given the chance to imitate the precise actions 
in the first place (i.e., using a bottle to transport water; for a 
direct comparison see Call et al. 2005; Horner and Whiten 
2005; Tennie et al. 2006, 2010; Whiten et al. 2009). Interest-
ingly, Hanus et al. (2011) found that encountering a partial 
solution (i.e., a quarter-filled tube with the peanut floating 
atop) did not facilitate the solution for apes as it did for chil-
dren, perhaps because in the end-state condition apes could 
access the peanut and touch the water (i.e., were reinforced), 
whereas they could not do so in the case of the quarter-filled 
tube. However, future studies are needed to investigate the 
difference between learning from a partial and a full solution 
in problem-solving situations more closely.
To sum up, visual feedback can play an important role in 
great ape problem-solving, especially with complex tasks 
like the FPT. In the current study, apes required visual feed-
back for first acquisition of the solution, but could uphold 
performance thereafter independent of visual feedback. 
Moreover, some apes acquired the solution after perceiv-
ing the end-state, that is, they produced the solution with 
their own actions. Future research may explore the phylo-
genetic roots of innovative problem-solving further, involv-
ing more diverse tasks and more primate species as well as 
larger samples.
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